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- THE FAILED STATES INDEX
Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace. July/August 2005

"How many states are at serious risk of state failure? The World Bank has identified about 30 'low-income countries under stress,' whereas Britain's Department for International Development has named 46 'fragile' states of concern. A report commissioned by the CIA has put the number of failing states at about 20. To present a more precise picture of the scope and implications of the problem, the Fund for Peace, an independent research organization, and FOREIGN POLICY have conducted a global ranking of weak and failing states. Using 12 social, economic, political, and military indicators, we ranked 60 states in order of their vulnerability to violent internal conflict."
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3098 [html format, several documents]

- ORPHANS OF CONFLICT: CARING FOR THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED
Donald Steinberg
United States Institute of Peace. October 2005

The crisis of internally displaced persons (IDPs) -- those who are driven from their homes by conflict, human rights abuses, natural disasters, and other causes, and who do not cross international borders -- affects some 25 million people in 50 countries. IDPs suffer severe humanitarian hardships, lack basic human rights, and are subject to abuse. The chaos and instability that accompanies internal displacement is an invitation to international crime, pandemic diseases, and trafficking in persons, drugs, and weapons. Host governments that are ultimately responsible for assisting, protecting, and returning IDPs to their homes are often unable or unwilling to do so. This report proposes five steps to improve the global response to internal displacement. If taken, these steps would build ownership of IDPs by host governments and foreign donors, implement rules and standards governing the response, reform the response of the United Nations and the United States, and create a permanent advocacy constituency for IDPs. The five steps are:

* National governments, foreign donors, and NGOs should apply the concept of sovereignty as the "responsibility to protect" to cases of large-scale internal displacement.
* Governments, international organizations, and NGOs should do more to implement the "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement," a nonbinding but comprehensive statement of the rights of IDPs and domestic and international responsibilities.
* The UN should designate the UN High Commissioner for Refugees as the lead UN agency for IDPs, or the secretary-general should assign a specific UN agency the lead for each new crisis of internal displacement.
* The U.S. government should strengthen the U.S. Agency for International Development's leadership on IDP assistance issues by earmarking resources for IDPs and providing a legislative mandate for this responsibility.
* The American public should create a new mechanism -- a "USA for IDPs" -- to highlight IDP crises, build a constituency for action, and provide a means for private Americans to respond financially.
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr148.html [pdf format, 20 pages]

- THE GLOBAL FUND AND PEPFAR IN U.S. INTERNATIONAL AIDS POLICY
Raymond W. Copson
Congressional Research Service. November 3, 2005

The United States is responding to the international AIDS pandemic through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which includes bilateral programs and contributions to the multilateral Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. PEPFAR overall appears on target to meet the Administration's five-year, $15 billion spending plan, although competing budget priorities could affect its prospects. By contrast, the Global Fund, which relies on multiple donors, is reporting a funding gap that may prevent it from awarding new grants to fight the pandemic. The United States pledged a total $600 million for 2006 and 2007 for the Fund, although Andrew Tobias, the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, suggested that Congress might provide a larger amount. Congress has consistently appropriated more than requested for the Fund. Representatives of the Global Fund and PEPFAR maintain that their programs are complementary, and that they are partners rather than competitors. The United States is the largest contributor to the Global Fund through PEPFAR. Advocates for the Global Fund seek a major increase in the U.S. contribution, arguing that it would affirm U.S. leadership in the struggle against AIDS and persuade other donors to increase their support. They believe that the Global Fund has several unique advantages, including its multilateral character, its contribution to capacity building, and its operations in countries other than the 15 PEPFAR focus countries. Supporters of U.S. bilateral programs note that they too build capacity and operate beyond the focus countries, while bringing the capacities of highly experienced U.S. agencies to bear in fighting the pandemic. Through PEPFAR, some argue, the United States is already doing more than its fair share in fighting AIDS, and any large increase for the Global Fund should come from other donor countries. U.S. officials and others are also encouraging contributions from private sector sources. Such contributions have been limited to date, apart from $150 million contributed by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/56861.pdf [pdf format, 16 pages]

- ADDRESSING OUR GLOBAL WATER FUTURE

Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Sandia National Laboratories. September 2005

This White Paper outlines the major conclusions of the Global Water Futures project. Jointly conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Sandia National Laboratories, the project's goal was to generate fresh thinking and concrete policy recommendations on how the United States can: 1. Better address future global water challenges; and 2. More efficiently leverage and deploy available technologies. The resulting White Paper makes the case for elevating the response to global water challenges to a strategic priority; identifies the most effective responses to global water challenges; and explores U.S. policy options, current and future. Consisting of four sections, the first section describes the nature and scope of the global water challenges that face the world. Sections two and three explore potential areas for innovation and synergy in policy, governance, capacity building, and the application of technologies. The final section examines how the United States should integrate water into its foreign policy.
http://www.csis.org/gsi/050928_gwf.pdf [pdf format, 134 pages]

- EXPLORING RELIGIOUS CONFLICT
Gregory F. Treverton, Heather S. Gregg, Daniel Gibran, Charles W. Yost.
The RAND Corporation. Web-posted September 2005

This report emanated from workshops hosted by the RAND National Security Research Division, which brought together intelligence analysts and experts on religion. The report's primary goal was to provide background and a frame of reference for assessing religious motivations in international politics. The authors note that the rise of religious movements in the late 20th century with a proclivity toward violence and terrorism has significantly changed the landscape of international politics. Another goal was to discover what causes religiously rooted violence and how states have sought to take advantage of, or contain, religious violence - with an emphasis on radical Islam. The report also sought to identify new religious movements that might pose foreign policy challenges to the United States, if not real security threats.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/RAND_CF211.pdf [pdf format, 84 pages]

- AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD 2005: OPINION LEADERS TURN CAUTIOUS, PUBLIC LOOKS HOMEWARD
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. November 2005

Produced in collaboration with the Council on Foreign Relations, this quadrennial study examines the foreign policy attitudes of the U.S. general public and U.S. opinion leaders -- state and local government officials; security and foreign affairs experts; military officers; news media, university, think tank, and religious leaders; and scientists and engineers. Conducted September 5 - October 31, 2005, the survey reflects the major changes in the world that have occurred since the previous poll was taken just prior to the 9/11 attacks. Principal findings indicate that, preoccupied with war abroad and growing problems at home, U.S. opinion leaders and the general public are taking a decidedly cautious view of America's place in the world. Over the past four years, for instance, opinion leaders have become less supportive of the United States playing a

"first among equals" role among the world's leading nations, and the goal of promoting democracy in other nations has lost ground. Other survey findings include:
* China's emerging global power is not triggering increased concern among opinion leaders or the general public.
* Underscoring the rising importance of Asia generally, foreign affairs specialists and security experts most often name India as a country likely to emerge as a more important U.S. partner.
* Solid majorities in every group of opinion leaders - and 84% of the public
- say it is important that the partnership between the U.S. and Western Europe remain close.
* Americans express considerable concern over the spread of AIDS and other infectious diseases.
* The public overwhelmingly believes post-9/11 restrictions on foreign student visas are worth it to prevent terrorists from entering the country.
* Americans view the goals of reducing the flow of illegal immigration and combating international drug trafficking as much more important long-term priorities than do opinion leaders.
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Pew-Americas_Place_2005.pdf [pdf format, 110 pages]

IRAQ

- ## NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR VICTORY IN IRAQ
National Security Council. November 2005

This document articulates the broad strategy the President set forth in 2003 and provides an update on our progress as well as the challenges remaining. The national strategy for victory in Iraq is summarized as "Helping the Iraqi People Defeat the Terrorists and Build an Inclusive Democratic State."
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/iraq_national_strategy_20051130[1].pdf [pdf format, 38 pages]

- ## STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ
Eric Davis
United States Institute of Peace. October 2005

The Education Program at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) is helping to rehabilitate the Iraqi higher education system by introducing courses in conflict resolution and peace education into university curricula throughout the country. This report suggests ways to involve the Iraqi higher education system in building and promoting democratic governance in Iraq. The report's main points include the following:
* Social justice and economic development are essential for democracy in Iraq to succeed.
* Iraq has a tradition and history of democracy that can help promote the successful establishment of a democratic form of government in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.
* Sixty percent of the Iraqi population is younger than 25. They have only known authoritarian rule and need to learn about democracy. The older generation of former

democratic activists can pass on to younger Iraqis their memories and experiences of pre-1963 Iraqi society.
* The establishment of an institution devoted to democracy could spread the concept of democratic government through workshops, contests, and grants to civil society organizations.
* Citizenship and service learning programs in Iraqi universities could promote democratic principles among older students. A national reading project and essay contest could introduce younger students to democracy and strengthen the literary skills necessary for an informed citizenry.
* The government should use the Internet's power to involve citizens in the democratic process and improve education. Television and radio programs, coffeehouse events, national "town hall" meetings, summer camps for youth, and emphasis on common folklore could help overcome ethnic differences and promote tolerance and unity among Iraq's diverse ethnic cultures.
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr153.html [pdf format, 20 pages]

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

- HAITI: INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE STRATEGY FOR THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS
Maureen Taft-Morales
Congressional Research Service. November 17, 2005

Haiti and its multilateral and bilateral donors developed an international assistance strategy, known as the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), to address Haiti's short-term needs between the collapse of the government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004 and the initial phase of a new government scheduled to be inaugurated in February 2006. The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union co-sponsored the International Donors Conference on Haiti in Washington, D.C., on July 19-20, 2004. The objective of the conference was to garner international financial support for the ICF, which outlines Haiti's priority needs and programs for 2004-2006. The Interim Cooperation Framework establishes priority needs and projects that fall under four broad categories, or "axes": political governance and national dialogue; economic governance and institutional development; economic recovery; and access to basic services. For each of these four strategic axes, the Framework provides a strategy, priority objectives, and monitoring indicators. Many congressional concerns regarding Haitian development are addressed by the priorities and programs outlined in the Interim Cooperative Framework. The main congressional concerns expressed regarding the Donors Conference strategy is the rate at which funds are being disbursed and the effectiveness of the aid being provided. International organizations and governments pledged $1.085 billion, to be disbursed over a two and a half-year period, from July 2004 through September 2006, eight months into a new administration, if elections proceed according to schedule. Initial disbursement was slow. According to the World Bank, however, the rate of disbursement began to improve after about six months. At just under the halfway point of the Donors Conference time-frame, a little less than half of the pledged funding had been disbursed, a tentative estimate of

$500 million as of July 2005. Disbursement has been uneven among donors. The United States has disbursed about half of its pledged funds. Some progress has been made toward the objectives outlined in the Interim Cooperation Framework, including voter registration, improvements in fiscal transparency, jobs creation, and broader access to clean water and other services.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57461.pdf [pdf format, 26 pages]

- VENEZUELA'S HUGO CHÁVEZ, BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM, AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Max G. Manwaring
Strategic Studies Institute. October 2005

The author of this monograph answers questions regarding "Who is Hugo Chávez?" "What is the basis of Chávez's bolivarianismo?" "What is the context that defines Bolivarian threats?" "How does Chávez define contemporary asymmetric warfare, and what are the key components of success?" "How can the innumerable charges and countercharges between the Venezuelan and U.S. governments be interpreted?" And "What are the implications for democracy and stability in Latin America?" In an attempt to answer these and related questions, the analysis centers on the contemporary geopolitical conflict context of current Venezuelan "Bolivarian" (bolivarianismo) policy. To accomplish this, a basic understanding of the political-historical context within which Venezuelan national security policy is generated is an essential first step toward understanding the situation as a whole. The second step requires an introductory understanding of Chavez's concept of 21st century socialism, and the political-psychological-military ways he envisions achieving it. Then, a levels of analysis approach will provide a systematic understanding of the geopolitical conflict options that have a critical influence on the logic that determines how such a policy as bolivarianismo might continue to be implemented by Venezuela or any other country in the contemporary world.. At the same time, this analysis provides an understanding of how other countries in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere might begin to respond to bolivarianismo's possible threats. Finally, this is the point from which one can generate strategic-level recommendations for maintaining and enhancing stability in Latin America.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf [pdf format, 39 pages]

TERRORISM

- COMBATING TERRORISM: THE CHALLENGE OF MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS
Raphael Perl
Congressional Research Service. November 23, 2005

This report is designed to assist congressional policymakers to understand and apply broad based objective criteria when evaluating progress in the nation's efforts to combat terrorism. It is not intended to define specific, in-depth, metrics for measuring progress against terrorism. How one perceives and measures progress is central to formulating

and implementing anti-terror strategy. Perception has a major impact, as well, on how nations prioritize and allocate resources. On the flip side, the parameters used to measure progress can set the framework for the measurement of failure. The measurement process is also inextricably linked to strategies. Progress is possible using diverse strategies, under very different approaches. The goals of terrorists and those who combat them are often diametrically opposed, but may also be tangential, with both sides achieving objectives and making progress according to their different measurement systems. Within the context of these competing views and objectives, terrorist activity may be seen as a process which includes discrete, quantum-like changes or jumps often underscoring its asymmetric and nonlinear nature. An approach which looks at continuous metrics such as lower numbers of casualties may indicate success, while at the same time the terrorists may be redirecting resources towards vastly more devastating projects. Policymakers may face consideration of the pros and cons of reallocating more of the nation's limited resources away from ongoing defensive projects and towards preventing the next quantum jump of terrorism, even if this means accepting losses. Measurement of progress, or lack thereof, may be framed in terms of incidents, attitudes and trends. A common pitfall of governments seeking to demonstrate success in anti-terrorist measures is overreliance on quantitative indicators, particularly those which may correlate with progress but not accurately measure it, such as the amount of money spent on anti-terror efforts. As terrorism is a complex multidimensional phenomenon, effective responses to terrorism may need to take into account, and to some degree be individually configured to respond to, the evolving goals, strategies, tactics and operating environment of different terrorist groups. Although terrorism's complex webs of characteristics — along with the inherent secrecy and compartmentalization of both terrorist organizations and government responses — limit available data, the formulation of practical, useful measurement criteria appears both tractable and ready to be addressed.

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57513.pdf [pdf format, 15 pages]

ARMS CONTROL / NONPROLIFERATION

• ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS
Bureau of Verification and Compliance, United States Department of State. August 30, 2005

This Congressionally mandated report reflects the importance the Administration and the U.S. Congress place upon compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments. A primary objective of the report is to highlight cases of noncompliance or of compliance concern, so that policymakers can focus their attention upon returning violators to full compliance as rapidly as possible. Another key objective is to make it very clear that the United States takes compliance assessment seriously, and applies only the highest standards of analytical rigor in making its compliance findings. The report's clarity and detail are designed to set the global standard for compliance assessment. The report, in turn, addresses U.S. compliance; compliance by Russia and other successor states of the Soviet Union with

treaties and agreements concluded bilaterally with the Soviet Union; compliance by other countries that are parties to multilateral agreements with the United States; and compliance with commitments made less formally that bear directly upon arms control, nonproliferation, and/or disarmament issues. Although the Report primarily reflects activities that occurred from January 1, 2002, through January 1, 2004, every effort has been made to include significant developments that have occurred more recently. Unless otherwise noted, compliance issues that first came to light after that period will be addressed in the Noncompliance Report due to Congress on April 15, 2006.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52113.pdf [pdf format, 111 pages]

- NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: THE U.S.-RUSSIAN AGENDA
Amy F. Woolf
Congressional Research Service. August 8, 2005

By the late 1990s, arms control negotiations were not as important to the U.S.-Russian relationship as they were to the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the United States and Russia continued to implement existing nuclear arms control agreements and to pursue negotiations on further reductions in their strategic offensive weapons and modifications to limits on ballistic missile defenses. This issue brief summarizes these agreements and tracks progress in their ratification and implementation.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IB98030.pdf [pdf format, 19 pages]